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ABSTRACT
This paper uses a new pre-1940 Third World data base documenting real wages and relative
factor prices to explore their determinants. There are three possibilities: external price shocks, factor
endowment changes, and technological change. As the paper's title suggests, technological change
is an unlikely explanation. The paper lays out an explicit econometric agenda for the future,
although more casual empiricism suggests that external price shocks were doing most of the work,
and declining-transport-cost-induced commodity price convergence in particular. Real wages in
Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America never showed any signs of catching up with the European
industrial leaders prior to 1914, but theyhold their own. The ratio of wages to land rents, on the
other hand, declined up to World War I, and so did the ratio of wages to GDP per capita. The trend
reversed thereafter. These relative factor price movements help sharpen our understanding of the
sources of growth (or lack of it) in Asia and Latin America prior to 1940. They also offer strong
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Two important features of the world economy after 1950 also characterized the economy after 1850.
First, there was rapid globalization during the previous century too: capital and labor flowed across national
frontiers in unprecedented quantities, and at rising rates; and commodity trade boomed as transport costs
dropped sharply. Second, the late 19th century underwent an impressive convergence in living standards, at
least within most of what we would now call the OECD, but what historians call the Atlantic economy. Poor
countries around the European periphery tended to grow faster than the rich industrial leaders at the European
core, and often even faster than the richer countries overseas in the New World.This club excluded most of
what is now called the Third World and eastern Europe, and even around this limited periphery there were
some who failed to catch up. Nonetheless, there was convergence.
It was not always that way: unambiguous divergence took place earlier. In the first half of the
previous century and before, the Atlantic economy was characterized by prohibitively high transport costs,
mercantilist protection, modest levels of commodity trade, no mass migrations, and an underdeveloped global
capital market. Two profound shocks occurred in this environment still hostile to liberal globalization policy:
early industrialization in Britain which then spread to a few countries on the European continent; and resource
"discovery' in the New World, set in motion by technological advances which produced sharply declining
transport costs linking overseas suppliers to European markets, so much so that real freight rates fell by an
enormous 1.5 percent per annum between 1840 and 1910 (O'Rourke and Williamson, 1998: ch. 3). These
two shocks triggered a divergence in real wages and living standards across the Atlantic economy that lasted
until the middle of the century (Williamson 1996, 1 998e). However, Robert Allen (1998) has shown that the
divergence probably started in Europe long before the early 19th century, perhaps as early as the 16th
1century.'
Figure 1 shows that the convergence which started in mid-century continued up to 1914: a plot of the
dispersion of real wages is given there, documenting what the modern macro economists call beta-
convergence. The line with the diamonds on the upper left of Figure 1 is based on a 13-country Atlantic
economy sample including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United States. The dashed line in Figure 1 documents
convergence for an expanded 17-country Atlantic economy sample, now including in addition Argentina,
Canada, Denmark and Italy. This measure shows the convergence tide ebbing around 1900. If we exclude
Canada and the United States, two "exceptional" rich countries which bucked the convergence tide,
convergence continues rapidly up to 1914 (the 15-country sample plotted with the triangles). If we exclude in
addition two Mediterranean Basin countries which failed to play the globalization game, Portugal and Spain,
convergence up to 1914 is faster still (the 13-country sample plotted with the squares).
Meanwhile, what happened in the Third World? Angus Maddison's (1995) GDP per capita estimates
document a widening gap between Europe and Asia, although the gap with Latin America is more stable. But
is it obvious that GDP per capita and real wage gaps should have behaved the same way? Maybe not, if
relative factor prices behaved differently in the periphery than in the center, and if the price of wage goods
behaved differently than GDP price deflators. So, what happened to relative factor prices generally, and to the
relative cost of labor specifically, when Latin America and Asia responded to the challenge of both the
European industrial revolution and the first great globalization boom? And what happened to them during de-
globalization after 1914?
These are the questions that motivate this paper. They are in the tradition of W. Arthur Lewis who
was the first to ask whether the core pulled along the periphery during this first great globalization boom
workis important since it challenges the conventional wisdom that the industrial revolution
was the prime mover of the center-periphery gap.
2(Lewis 1969, 1978a, 1978b). It was he, together with Alexander Gerschenkron (1952), who first tried to
break the economic historian's tenacious fixation on the industrial leaders, Lewis focusing on the Third
World and Gerschenkron on European late corners like Italy and eastern Europe. Thus, these questions are
not new to Latin American or Asian economic history, but they could not be attacked very well even only a
decade ago since the data had not been gathered in such a way as to make these comparative judgments
possible. Now we have enough to make some real progress.
Globalization and the Third World: Breaking Down the Tyranny of Distance
In a book entitled The Tyranny of Distance (1966), Geoffrey Blame showed how distance shaped
Australian history. Distance had the same impact on the rest of Asia until late in the 19th century, isolating
the Asian periphery from the European core where, after all, the industrial revolution was unfolding. By the
late 19th century, transport innovations had started to change all that, although not completely. The
appearance of the Suez Canal, cost-reducing innovations on sea-going transport, and railroads penetrating the
interior did not completely liberate Asia from the tyranny of distance by 1914. Indeed, economists have
shown that growth performance today is tjil associated with whether a country is landlocked, whether the
length of its coastline is limited, and whether it is far removed from OECD centers like New York, Rotterdarn
or, in 1999 but not in 1899, Tokyo (Radelet, Sachs and Lee 1997; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger 1998; Bloom
and Sachs 1998). Yet, it was the change in economic distance between core and periphery which triggered
economic change in late 19th century Asia, even though economic distance was still extensive and trade
shares low long after 1940.
Transport cost declines from interior to port and from port to Europe ensured that Asian economies
became more integrated into world markets. Price gaps between Britain and Asia were driven down by the
completion of the Suez Canal (Fletcher 1958), by the switch from sail to steam, and by other productivity'
3advances on long distance sea lanes. The cotton price spread between Liverpool and Bombay fell from 57
percent in 1873 to 20 percent in 1913, and the jute price spread between London and Calcutta fell from 35 to
4 percent (Collins 1996: Table 4). The same events were taking place even farther East, involving Burma and
Java. The freight rates on sugar between Java and Amsterdam fell by 50-60 percent between 1870 and World
War I (Yasuba 1978: Graph 2). They fell by about 65 percent on rice shipments between Burma and Britain
(Yasuba 1978: Graph 2). Indeed, the rice price spread between London and Rangoon fell from 93 to 26
percent in the four decades prior to 1913 (Collins 1996: Table 4). These events had a profound impact on the
creation of an Asian market for wheat and rice, and, even more, on the creation of a truly global market for
grains (Latham and Neal 1983; Brandt 1985, 1993; Kang and Cha 1996). These technological events had
their impact on trade and transport costs within the region as well. The freight rate on coal (relative to its
export price) between Nagasaki and Shanghai fell by 76 percent between 1880 and 1910, and it has been
estimated that the total factor productivity growth rate on Japan's tramp freighter routes serving Asia
advanced at 2.5 percent per annum in the thirty years between 1879 and 1909 (Yasuba 1978: Tables 1 and
5).
This commodity price convergence generated an Asian trade boom between 1870 and 1913,just as it
did in the Atlantic economy. Export shares in GDP (constant price, Maddison 1995: 190 and 237) almost
doubled in India (3 to 5.7 percent); they more than doubled in Indonesia (ito 2.2 percent); and they more
than tripled in Thailand (2.1 to 6.7 percent). But the greatest 19th century globalization shock in Asia did not
involve transport revolutions at all. Under the persuasion of American gun ships, Japan switched from virtual
autarky to free trade in 1858. It is hard to imagine a more dramatic switch from closed to open trade policy,
even by the standards of the recent Asian Miracle. In the fifteen years following 1858, Japan's foreign trade
rose 70 times, from nil to 7 percent of national income (Huber 1971). The prices of (labor-intensive)
exportables soared in Japan, rising towards world market levels; the prices of (land and machine-intensive)
importables slumped in Japan, falling towards world market levels. One researcher estimates that Japan's
4terms of trade rose by a factor of 3.5 between 1858 and the early 1870s (Huber 1971); another thinks the rise
was even bigger, a factor of 4.9 between 1857 and 1875 (Yasuba 1996: 548). Whichever estimate one
accepts, this combination of declining transport costs and the dramatic switch to free trade unleashed
exceptionally powerful globalization forces in Japan. Other Asian nations followed this liberal path, most
forced to do so by colonial dominance or gunboat diplomacy. Thus, China signed a treaty in 1842 opening her
ports to trade and adopting a 5 percent ad valorem tariff limit. Siam adopted a 3 percent tariff limit in 1855.
Korea emerged from it's autarkic "Hermit Kingdom" about the same time, undergoing market integration
with Japan long before colonial status became formalized in 1910 (Cha 1998). India went the way of British
free trade in 1846, and Indonesia mimicked Dutch liberalism. In short, by the 1 860s commodity price
convergence was driven entirely by the sharply declining transport costs in Asia withoutmuch change in
tariffs one way or the other. Asian commitment to globalization started (and stuck) more than a centuiy ago,
while Europe and its overseas offshoots began to show plenty of signs of globalization backlash before the
interwar race to autarky (Williamson 1 998e).
This account of Asia's emergence from economic isolation applies to Latin America as well. First of
all, the economic distance to the European core varied considerably depending upon location in Latin
America. The Panama Canal was not completed until 1914, and before then the Andean economies --Peru
and Ecuador --wereveiy seriously disadvantaged in European trade except for very high value and low bulk
commodities produced along the coast, like guano. And prior to the introduction of a railroad network, the
landlocked countries of Bolivia and Paraguay were at an even more serious disadvantage. This was also true
of the Mexican interior (Coatsworth 1981), the Colombian interior, and the Argentine interior (Newland
1998). A close observer of early 19th century Latin America, Belford Hinton Wilson, reported in 1842 the
costs of moving a ton of goods from London to the following capital cities (in pounds sterling): Buenos Aires
and Montevideo 2; Lima 5.12; Santiago 6.58; Caracas 7.76; Mexico City 17.9; Quito 21.3; Sucre or
Chuquisca, 25.6; and Bogata 52.9. The variance is huge, with the costs to Quito, Sucre, Chuquisca, Bogata,
5and Mexico City nine to twenty-seven times that of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, the latter well placed on
either side of the Rio de la Plata (Brading 1969: 243-4).
Geographic isolation helps explain much of the subsequent dismal growth performance in these
(mostly poor) parts of Latin America in the 19th century. Even after the Latin American late 19th century
railroad boom, much of the region's interior was still isolated: for example, railway track per 1,000
populationin Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru were still only about a tenth that of Australia, New
Zealand and Canada in 1912 (Bulmer-Thomas 1994: Table 4.4, p. 107). Furthermore, and as I noted above,
the tyranny of distance did not disappear as a development obstacle in these poor and initially-isolated parts
of Latin America even after 1940 (Radelet, Sachs and Lee 1997; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger 1998). Bolivia,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, the Argentine interior and the Mexican interior all faced and still face a trade
disadvantage, and if trade matters to growth, those countries face a growth disadvantage as well.
In contrast, the Latin American countries bordering on the Atlantic, with long coastlines and with
good navigable river systems, have always been favored by a trade advantage and thus a growth advantage as
well. These include Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Central America, Cuba and the other Caribbean islands.
These regions may have failed for other reasons, but geographic isolation certainly wasn't one of them.
Transport cost declines from interior to port, and from port to Europe or to the East and Gulf Coast
of the United States, ensured that Latin American economies became more integrated into world markets after
around 1850. Price gaps between Britain and both Americas were driven down and trade stimulated as a
consequence. True, transport costs and price differentials involving trade between Europe andNorth America
are far better documented than are those between Europe and South America. Yet, the qualitative literature
suggests that the same was happening south of the US border. Investment in river and harbor improvements
increased briskly everywhere in the Atlantic economy, and the Panama Canal had a specific impact on Latin
American trade. The switch from sail to steam was gradual, but it accounted for a steady decline in transport
costs across the Atlantic (Harley 1988). A series of innovations in subsequent decades helped make
6steamships more efficient: the screw propeller, the compound engine, steel hulls, bigger size and shorter turn-
around time in port. Refrigeration was another technological innovation with major Latin American trade
implications. Mechanical refrigeration was developed between 1834 and 1861, and by 1870 chilled beef was
being transported from the United States to Europe (Mokyr 1990: 141). In 1876, the first refrigerated ship,
the Fri gorfique, sailed from Argentina to France carrying frozen beef. By the 1880s, South American meat
was being exported in large quantities to Europe. Not only did railways and steamships mean that European
farmers were faced with overseas competition in the grain market, but refrigeration also deprived them of the
natural protection distance had always provided local meat and dairy producers. The consequences for
European farmers of this overseas competition would be profound (O'Rourke 1997; O'Rourke and
Williamson 1998: Chp. 6).
The impact of these productivity improvements on transport costs around the Atlantic economy can
be seen graphically in Figure 2. What is labeled the North index (North 1958) accelerates its fall after the
1830s, and what is labeled the British index (Harley 1988) is fairly stable up to mid century before
undergoing the same, big fall. The North freight rate index among American export routes dropped by more
than 41 percent in real terms between 1870 and 1910. The British index fell by about 70 percent, again in
real tenns, between 1840 and 1910. These two indices imply a steady decline in Atlantic economy transport
costs of about 1.5 percent per annum, for a total of 45 percentage points up to 1913, a big number indeed.
There is another way to get a comparative feel for the magnitude of this decline. The World Bank reports that
tariffs on manufactures entering developed country markets fell from 40 percent in the late 1940s to 7 percent
in the late 1970s, a 33 percentage point decline over thirty years (Wood 1994: 173). While impressive, this
spectacular postwar reclamation of "free trade" from interwar autarky is still smaller than the 45 percentage
point fall in trade barriers between 1870 and 1913 due to transport improvements.
What was the impact of changing transport costs on trans-Atlantic commodity price gaps between
Latin America and European markets? If they behaved anything like Anglo-American price differentials, they
7must have produced powerful commodity price convergence. Liverpool wheat prices exceeded Chicago wheat
prices by 58 percent in 1870, by 18 percent in 1895, and by 16 percent in 1912.2 Moreover, these wheat price
quotes understate the size of the price convergence because they ignore the collapse in price gaps between
farm and interior railhead. The second biggest tradable foodstuff consisted of meat and animal fats such as
beef, pork, mutton and butter. Based on London-Cincinnati price differentials for bacon, there was no
convergence across the 18 70s and 18 80s, but the price convergence after 1895 was even moredramatic for
meat than it was for wheat: price gaps were 93 percent in 1870, 92 percent in 1895, and 18 percent in 1913.
The price convergence for meat and dairy products required those advances in refrigeration made towards the
end of the century. Anglo-American price data are also available for many other non-agricultural
commodities. The trans-Atlantic cotton textile price gap, which had been 14 percent in 1870, completely
vanished by 1913; the iron bar price gap fell from 75 to 21 percent, while the pig iron price gap fell from 85
to 19 percent, and the copper price gap fell from 33 percent to almost zero. More relevant to Argentina and
Uruguay, the trans-Atlantic hides price gap fell from 28 to 9 percent, while the wool price gap fell from 59 to
28 percent.
What was the impact of these transport innovations on Latin American trade? While the estimates
offered by Victor Bulmer-Thomas (1994: Table A.2. 1, p. 439) may be rough, they show a huge increase: the
share of Latin American exports in GDP rose from about 10 percent in 1850, to about 25 percent in 1912.
When historians look at this period, they tend to focus on the trade boom, ignoring the fact that the world-
wide decline in transport costs after mid century was enormous. This is a mistake. The volume of trade is not
by itself a satisfactory index of commodity market integration. It is the cost of moving goods between
markets that counts. The cost has two parts, that due to transport costs and that due to policy (such as tariffs).
The price spread between markets is driven by changes in these costs, and they need not move in the same
direction. Tariffs in the Atlantic economy didfall from the 1870s to World War I; the globalization which
2 The remainder of this paragraph draws its evidence from O'Rourke and Williamson (1994).
8took place in the late 19th century cannot be assigned to more liberal trade policy. Instead, it was falling
transport costs which provoked globalization. Indeed, rising tariffs were mainly a defensive response to the
competitive winds of market integration as transport costs declined (O'Rourke and Williamson 1998: Chps. 3
and 6).
The decline in transport costs created commodity price convergence in the world economy up to the
Great War, and most of Asia, Latin America and the Middle East were a very big part of it. Indeed, the Third
World may have been even a part of it to the extent that tariffs were rarely raised there to mute the
impact of globalization, in contrast with the European continent, North America and Australasia (Williamson
1 998e).3 Trade boomed. Pre-1940 Third World globalization forces are now on the agenda, just where W.
Arthur Lewis (1969, 1978a, 1978b) insisted they should be. Note, however, that I have said nothing about
that old chestnut, the North-South terms of trade. In contrast to that enormous literature (Diakosavvas and
Scandizzo 1991), I have tried to emphasize that the transport cost declines influencing the trade connection
between the Third World periphery and European core were so great that practically every country underwent
an improvement in its terms of trade. It wasa zero-sum game. Prior to the Great War, the use of history to
shed light on the North-South terms of trade debate is badly misplaced. The history after the Great War is
another matter entirely.
Let us now explore the behavior of real wages and relative factor prices in the Third World periphery
relative to the European core.
A Word About Measurement: Factor Prices Versus Output Aggregates
Most economists who have written about the comparative growth of nations have used GDP per
There are obvious exceptions, like Japan's restrictions on rice imports after the turn of the century
and tariffs in many parts of Latin America. I will deal with the Japanese exception below.
9capita or per worker to measure catching up and convergence, or falling behind and divergence. There are at
least four good reasons why it is a mistake for the convergence debate to used these output aggregates
exclusively while ignoring wages and other factor prices. The arguments apply with special force to the pre-
1940 Third World where industrialization and technological advance were mostly absent.
First, the pre-1940 real wage data for the Third World are of far better quality than the GDP data,
and they are certainly available for a wider sample.4 Indeed, while that vigorous pioneer Angus Maddison
(1995) is able to document real GDP per capita for a surprisingly large part of early Asia, he still can only
record observations for the following: Burma, the Philippines, Korea and Taiwan start only with the turn of
this century and offer nothing for the previous one; Thailand starts with 1870, and repeats only every twenty
years until 1913; Bangladesh and Pakistan start in 1820 but then leap over eighty years to 1900; China and
Japan start in 1820 but then leap fifty years to 1870; and India and Indonesia start in 1820, leap to 1850 and
then report observations only for every twenty years up to 1913. While impressive, such GDP per capita data
are usually not enough to deal adequately with the questions raised in the introduction to this paper. Similarly,
Maddison is able to document real GDP per capita for a surprisingly small part of 19th century Latin
America: for 1820, he gives estimates of GDP per capita only for Brazil and Mexico, two countries which
based on 1900 population data would have accounted for only 53 percent of Latin America; a half century
later, he offers estimates for one more, Argentina, raising the share of Latin America covered to 61 percent
(again, based on 1900 population); thirty years later, he offers estimates for four more, but there are still
many missing. Real wages in Latin America can be documented for the following (Williamson 1998c):
Argentina from 1864; Southeast Brazil from 1830; Northeast Brazil from 1855; Colombia from 1863; Cuba
from 1905; Mexico from 1877; and Uruguay from 1880. Furthermore, we can make statements about ppp-
adjusted urchasing-power-parity adjusted) real wages relative to the European core for both Asia and Latin
'Thereal wage data are purchasing-power-parity adjusted, they are typically daily or weekly, and
they are typically for urban unskilled male workers. See any of my working papers on either Asia, Latin
America or the Mediterranean (Williamson 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).
10America. In addition, these real wage time series are typically available annually, so that epochs and major
ti.irning points can be identified with much greater clarity than is true of the GDP data which are usually
reported for every two decades or even longer.
Second, income distribution matters, and wage rates (especially when combined with other factor
prices) offer a window by which to look in on distribution issues. Real people earn wages or skill premiums
or profits or rents, not that statistical artifact known as GDP per capita. By averaging all incomes, growth
economists (and economic historians that mimic them) throw away valuable information.
Third, factor price movements help us understand the growth of nations. For example, productivity
catch-up in a poor country is more likely to increase all factor prices equally than is mass emigration (easing
population pressure on the land) or an export boom for agricultural products (increasing the demand for
land). The open economy forces which are likely to have been most important in driving late 19th century
economic change in Asia and Latin America --tradeand factor flows --operateddirectly on factor prices, and
thus only indirectly on GDP per capita. An exclusive focus on GDP per capita misses most of the story.
Fourth, economic change nearly always involves winners and losers, a fact which is crucial in
accounting for the evolution of policy and the survival of empires, perhaps more so in politically independent
societies like Japan, Siam and post-revolutionary Latin America, than in dependent colonial societies like
Indonesia and India. Still, changes that would increase GDP per capita but would also cause losses to some
politically powerful group are often successfully resisted even in colonial economies, and examining the
behavior of factor prices is a good way to start the search for the sources of such political resistance.
When Did the Core-Periphery Gap Open Up? Looking at Asia
When did the gap between core and periphery open up in Asia? Table 1 offers an answer by using
my ppp-adjusted, urban, unskilled, daily or weekly real wages for males from eight countries in Asia, all
11reported relative to Britain. The reader may think the comparison with Britain is unfair since the leader
showed signs of failure in the late 19th century. It turns out that comparisons with the Netherlands make
things a little worse for Asia, and comparisons with the average of Britain, France and Germany makes things
a little better for Asia (Williamson 1998a: Table 4). But using alternative definitions of the European core
does not change inferences about the evolution of the core-periphery gap.
Let us begin with the extreme version of the labor surplus model and 19thcenturyreal wage trends.
The extreme version of W. Arthur Lewis's (1954) labor surplus model predicted a constant real wage, as did
the classical model developed by British economists who had not appreciated when they were writing how the
first industrial revolution was making a break with the past. Economists using 20thcenturydata dealt the
labor surplus model severe blo's in the 1960s, and it is no longer the dominant paradigm that it was four
decades ago. But might the model do better in pre-industrial 19thcenturyAsia?5 It does not. Prior to 1914,
real wages in Asia underwent enormous short and long run variation, even when standardized by British
performance. They collapsed by 42 percent in India between the early l870s and the Great War. They more
than doubled in Indonesia between the early 1 820s and 1910-1914. In Siam, they surged, from the early
1820s to the early 1880s, then lost all of those gains by World War I. In Japan, real wages showed no long
run trend at all until the 1880s, after which they started a steady climb which has persisted for a century.
Furthermore, in the 1 870s Asian real wages varied by a factor of five to one between the poorest we can
document, Egypt, and the richest, Thailand. True, theory tells us that even in steady state countries can reach
different equilibrium living standards (Barro and Sala-I-Matin 1995; Lucas 1998), but these differences seem
much too big to be explained by culture and attitudes towards family size. In addition, and as we have seen,
these real wage time series exhibit enormous variance, even when expressed as British relatives. Thus, real
wages and workers' living standards were hardly constant. The real wage data offer no support for the view
The odds are not good even here, given that the classical model cannot even explain British
experience between 1780 and 1820, the period for which it was originally constructed (Williamson 1985).
12that 19th century Asia was in steady state, or even that it was approaching steady state asymptotically.
Instead, the region seems to have been frequently perturbed by big shocks that took a long time to dissipate.
Next, note that the real wage relatives for Japan and Indonesia imply that the core-periphery gap was
no bigger in the 1 920s and 1 930s than it was a century earlier, about one-third and one-fifth of Britain. Thus,
Asian living standards were way behind Britain when the tyranny of distance held sway, long before the first
great globalization boom and even before the European industrial revolution really took hold in the first half
of the 19th century. While it would be unwise to infer the behavior of the rest of Asia from that of Japan and
Indonesia, their experience is not quite consistent with the revisionist findings of Kenneth Pomeranz (1997)
and others who recently developed the case that early 1 gth century living standards in the lower Yangzi and
Lingnan —China'stwo most advanced regions —wereat least as high as they were in southern England and
the Lowlands —Europe'stwo most advanced regions. Nor is the experience of Japan and Indonesia quite
consistent with the revisionist findings of Prasannan Parthasarathi (1998) who has recently developed the
case that living standards in south India were at least equal to that of England in the early 1 8th century. These
revisionist findings on China and India invite the inference that the European industrial revolution must
account for the gap between core and periphery. If that is so, why was there already a huge gap in the 1 820s
and 1830s? The 1820s may have been preceded by a half-century of industrial revolutionary events in Britain
but every historian agrees that those decades between 1780 and 1820 recorded only the most modest real
wage improvements in Britain (Lindert and Williamson 1983; Lindert 1994). There are only four ways to
resolve this paradox: the Pomeranz and Parthasarathi data grossly overstate living standards in 18th century
China and India; or the Williamson data grossly understate living standards in early 19th century Indonesia
and Japan; or there were 18th century events that mattered to the evolution of British economy just as much
as the industrial revolution; or Japan and Indonesia misrepresent the rest of Asia. On the latter, we do note
that the gap between Thailand and Britain widened a lot between the beginning and the end of the 19th
century, but all of that widening took place after the late 1880s. The paradox remains.
13Consider now Burma, Indonesia and Thailand, the southeast frontier of Asia. The available time
series for Burma is short, but what we do have suggests that living standards (relative to Britain) peaked
twice, in the 1870s and the 1900s. Indonesia and Thailand peaked in between. The enormous rise in living
standards in these parts of the southeast Asian frontier is consistent with globalization, rising export prices,
and settlement on an extensive margin. The collapse after the 1870s and 1880s must be explained by other
factors since the positive globalization forces were still at work until primary product prices collapsed after
the Great War. Presumably, the extensive margin disappeared and continued immigration into the region
began to press downwards the still-relatively-high-compared-to-emigrating-areas living standard. These are
only speculations, and we may need different ones to explain the same trends in India. Real wages in India
collapsed sharply between the late 1880s and the Great War (again, relative to Britain), and it was happening
everywhere on the subcontinent (Williamson 1998a: Table 8). India seemed to share the same dismal post-
1 880s experience that was true of Southeast Asia.
Korean and Taiwanese experience seems at first sight to be consistent with the nationalist critique
that Japanese imperialism eroded workers' living standards there (Kimura 1995; Kang and Cha 1996).
Certainly living standards fell there after occupation. But correlation is not necessarily causation. How much
of these trends can be attributed to Japanese imperial policy? If the answer is most of it, then exactly how did
Japanese policy in Korea and Taiwan differ from US policy in the Philippines, and can the policy differences
explain their strikingly different experience with the evolution of living standards? On the other hand, the
decline in Korean and Taiwanese living standards might be explained by the collapse in primary product
prices in world markets facing these relatively small economies that were heavily dependent on trade. If so,
why weren't living standards sagging elsewhere in Asia from the turn of the century to the late 1920s,
especially in the Philippines? We add these questions to a growing agenda, but some of them will be
confronted again when we look below at relative factor price trends.
So, how did Asian living standard growth measure up with Britain? Japan's real wage was 33
14percent of Britain in the early 1830s, and it was 32 percent of Britain in the late 1920s. No catching up here,
but at least Japan was able to hold her own, first by switching in the 1 850s from autarky to free trade, and
second by mounting a very successful industrialization program after the 1880s. While the former didn't stick
(the real wage gains up to the late 1 850s and early 1 860s disappeared by the 1 870s), the latter certainly did.
The other two success stories in 1 9thcenturyAsia were brief. Indonesia and Thailand were actually catching
up on Britain during their real wage surge from the 1 820s to the 1 880s, which was impressive since Britain
was undergoing unusually fast real wage growth during that period. Table 1 documents that Egypt and
Turkey also rose to a secular peak (relative to Britain) about the same time. With the exception of the
Philippines, the rest of Asia was falling behind the European core. The core-periphery gap was already wide
by the end of the first third of the 9'' century, but it got even wider during the rest of the 1 9thcentury,
especially after the 1 880s. Finally, note that compared with Britain every Asian country had real wages in the
late 1930s (1935-1939) equal to or a little greater than real wages just prior to World War 1(1910-1914).
Asia did a much better job holding its own with Britain during the quarter century after 1914 than during the
quarter century before.
Asia's real wage performance over the century from the 1 820s to the 1930s was impressive. No,
there was no catching up on the European industrial leaders. Yes, Asia grew pretty much at the same rate.
And Asia did it without any industrial revolution and under conditions of technological quiescence.
When Did the Core-Periphery Gap Open Up? Looking at Latin America
Table 2 documents that Argentina was catching up with Britain in the half-century before World War
I. There is also some modest evidence that the Brazilian Southeast started catching up from mid-century. But
catch up with the European leaders doesn't seem to have been taken place anywhere else in Latin America.
Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay were able to hold their own up to the Great War, but real wages there did not
15catch up with those in Britain. Nor is there any evidence of catchup in the Brazilian Northeast or in Cuba.
Like Asia, Latin America did not exhibit much evidence of catchup on Europe's industrial leaders
to 1914, but it did hold its own. In contrast with Asia, there is plenty of evidence of Latin American
slowdown and fall back .fici 1914. Why the difference? Relative to the world leaders, better growth
performance in Latin America prior to World War I than afterwards seems to be highly correlated with an
open policy on one side of that divide and a closed policy on the other. But any agenda whose goal it is to
isolate the role of policy in accounting for the different growth experience on either side of 1914 needs to
control for eveiything else that might matter: bad luck in world commodity markets, bad luck in world factor
markets, demography, the tyranny of distance and other forces. The examination of relative factor price
perfonnance might help sort these factors out.
Third World Trends in Wage-Rental Ratios Before 1940
The move to free trade in much of Asia, plus the revolutionary decline in transport costs everywhere
in the Third World, steadily eroded price gaps between the European core and the periphery in the half-
century before 1914. It probably eroded them even more within the periphery, since there was far less
globalization backlash there. Prices of exportables boomed in the exporting countries. Price trends reversed
after World War I, but on either side of that great divide one would have thought that the relative rewards to
land and labor should have been dramatically affected. Exactly how they were affected should have depended,
of course, on whether the abundant factor was land --asin Argentina and the Punjab --orlabor --asin
Japan. Consider the canonical land-scarce and labor-abundant case, Japan. When Japan emerged from
isolation after 1858, prices of its labor-intensive exportables soared, rising towards world market levels,
while prices of its land and machine-intensive importables slumped, falling towards world market levels. The
Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that the abundant factor (labor) should have flourished while the scarce
16factor (land) should have languished over the fifteen years or so following 1858. Did they?
The available factor price evidence for Japan in mid-century is limited. Table 3 confirms that data on
land rents or land values are not available until 1885, long after Japan's leap to openness had taken place. But
we do have some crude evidence, and it seems to confirm the Heckscher and Ohlin hypothesis. Maddison
(1995: 182) estimates that real GDP per capita increased by only 17 percent between 1820 and 1870.
Assume that all of that increase took place between 1850 and 1870, an unlikely event that argues against the
thesis. J. Richard Huber (1971) estimates that the real wage for unskilled workers in Osaka and Tokyo
increased by 67 percent in this period. True, this huge increase is much bigger than the real wage growth I
have estimated; we would have to go all the back in my data to the late 1830s to find a real wage increase
between then and 1870 (about 63 percent) anything like that estimated by Huber (Williamson 1998a:
Appendix Table 5.3). Nevertheless, consider the implication of Huber's estimates: the wage of unskilled
labor, the abundant factor, increased by 43 percent relative to average incomes in Japan. And under plausible
assumptions,6 this implies that land rents 1Q11bymore than 50 percent in Japan. Thus, the wage-rental ratio
rose by more than 3.3 times (from 1.0 to 1.67/0.50). To repeat, this is exactly what one would have predicted
when a technologically quiescent economy is hit with a huge price shock which favors the exportable and
disfavors the importable: in a land-scarce economy like pre-industrial Japan, the wage-rental ratio should
have soared, with obvious distributional (and, one supposes, political) implications.
6 The aritlmietic is trivial. Let national income (Y) equal the sum of wages (wL, the wage per worker
times the total labor force) and land rents (rD, rent per hectare times total hectares), and ignore skills, capital
and all else: Y =wL+ rD. Then per worker income growth is (where an "*"refersto the percentage growth
over the full fifteen years):
Y*L* =%VOL+ L*(OLl) + r'O.
I assume that labor and lands share exhausted national income, and that labor got 60 percent. I also assume
that land hectarage was fixed, and that labor force growth (assumed equal to population growth) was 7.6
percent between 1850 and 1870 (Maddison 1995: 106). If some of the GDP per capita growth between 1820
and 1870 actually took place before 1850, then land rents fell by even more than what I guess here. This
calculation is taken from O'Rourke and Williamson (1998: Chp. 4).
17These are only informed guesses, of course, but Table 3 reports the real thing. Wage-rental ratio
trends can be constructed for Japan starting 1885, Korea starting 1909 and Taiwan starting 1904. In contrast
with the Punjab after 1873 or Japan after 1858, the early 20th century was not a period of technological
quiescence in East Asian agriculture. Instead, the region was undergoing land-saving and labor-using
innovation (Hayami and Ruttan 1971), forces which should have served by themselves to raise the wage-
rental ratio. It was also a period of dramatic industrialization, at least in Japan, which served to pull labor off
the farms (Brandt 1993), another force serving to raise the wage-rental ratio. The period after 1910-1914 was
also one of unfavorable farm price shocks (Kimura 1993; Kang and Cha 1996), yet another force serving to
raise the wage-rental ratio. In short, we might expect those wage-rental ratio trends for Japan, initiated by
globalization forces in the mid-19th century, to have continued everywhere in East Asia in the 20th century.
That is exactly what Table 3 shows: East Asian wage-rental ratios surged up to the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed,
land-scarce Europe experienced the same surge in wage-rental ratios during the so-called grain invasion after
the 1 870s, at least where trade policy remained liberal (O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson 1996).
Furthermore, the magnitudes were not so different. Between 1910/14 and 1925/29, the wage-rental ratio rose
by 88 percent in Japan, by 46 percent in Korea, and by 40 percent in Taiwan (Table 3). The average increase
in the wage-rental ratio for Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Sweden was 39 percent between 1890 and 1910,
and 120 percent between 1870 and 1890 (O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson 1996: Table 1). It might also be
relevant to add that politically powerful landed interests were able to secure some protection from these
globalization forces in both continental Europe with tariffs on grain (O'Rourke 1997; Williamson 1998e) and
in Japan with import restrictions on rice (Brandt 1993).
In contrast with East Asia and Europe, I take the Punjab to have been relatively land abundant, an
assumption that seems to be confirmed by the fact that agricultural exports from that Indian region to Europe
18boomed after the 1860s and early 1870s.7 Globalization should have had the opposite effect on the wage-
rental ratio in land-abundant Punjab compared with land-scarce Japan: it should have fallen. And fall it did.
Between 1873-79 and 1910-14, the wage-rental ratio in the Punjab fell by 61 percent. The Punjab' s wage-
rental ratio experience was not so different from that of the Latin American southern cone and other parts of
the New World. From the late 1880s to World War I, the wage-rental ratio fell by 71 percent in the combined
trio of Australia, Argentina and the United States (O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson 1996: Table 2), and it
fell by 79 percent in Argentina alone. Egypt, riding a cotton boom, conformed to these trends in Asia and
Latin America: from the 1870s to 1915-1919, the wage-rental ratio fell by 56 percent, and from the late
1880s it fell by 87 percent (Table 3).
The factor-price-convergence theorem seems to have been alive and well in Asia, Latin America and
the Middle East before 1940. So far, however, I have not said a word about changing resource endowments,
labor supplies, and the Lewis model. The next section will do so.
Hints aboutInequalityTrends in the Third World Before 1940
Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin (Flam and Flanders 1991) argued that the integration of global
commodity markets would lead to convergence of international factor prices, as countries everywhere
expanded the production and export of commodities which used their abundant (and cheap) factor intensively.
As we have seen, limited historical evidence from the pre-1940 Third World seems to be consistent with
Heckscher and Ohlin: the trade boom between the 1 870s and the 1 920s led to rising wage-rental ratios in
relatively labor-abundant East Asia, and to falling wage-rental ratios in relatively land-abundant Argentina,
71t is relative endowments that count for specialization and trade. Presumably, both labor and land
had low productivity in the Punjab compared with Western Europe. The effective stocks of labor and land
were both very low.
19Egypt, the Punjab, and probably Siam and other parts of Southeast Asia.8 As a consequence, conditions
appear to have improved for the poor unskilled worker relative to the rich landlord in East Asia, while the
opposite was probably true of Argentina, Egypt, Siam, Burma, and the Punjab. All of this borders on
speculation, of course, since the globalization inference is guided by wage-rental ratio trends in a very small
sample.
What about elastic labor supplies? In his famous model of the labor surplus economy, W. Arthur
Lewis (1954) showed how early industrialization could create inequality (and also a rising surplus to finance
domestic-savings-constrained accumulation). Stable real wages implied rising profit shares economy-wide.
According to his model, the worker fails to share in GDP per capita growth since elastic labor supplies keep
wages and living standards stable.
Lewis thought that his model of development with elastic labor supplies applied to late 19th century
Latin America where European mass migration glutted labor markets and to tropical regions where Chinese
and Indian contract labor did the same (Lewis 1 978a), and many scholars subsequently agreed. Carlos Diaz-
Alejandro wrote that the labor supply in Argentina before 1930 was "perfectly elastic at the going wage (plus
some differential) in the industrial centers of Italy and Spain" (1970: 21-2). Nathaniel Leff thought the same
was true of the Brazilian Southeast and that elastic labor supplies could account for stable wages in Sao
Paulo and Santos from the 1880s onwards (see Table 2 and Leff 1992: 6). If the elastic labor supply thesis is
correct, then late 19th century Latin emigration should have been far more responsive to wage gaps between
home and abroad compared with the early emigrants from northwest Europe going to North America,
Australia and New Zealand. The hypothesis has been soundly rejected (Hatton and Williamson 1994; 1998:
Chp. 3): Latin emigrants were no more responsive to wage gaps between home and abroad than was the case
SIdo not have adequate wage-rental ratio data for Southeast Asia, a labor-scarce frontier. However,
note in Table 1 that real wages (relative to Britain) were falling in Burma, Indonesia and Thailand after the
1870s, in most cases dramatically. Furthermore, using the data in Feeny (1982: Table 3-10) on land prices
and in Williamson (1998a: Appendix Table 9.1) on nominal wages, we can say something about wage-rental
trends in Thailand 1915:they fell sharply, from an index of 100 to 76.
20for other European emigrants. It is simply not true that the Latin economies in the late 19th century had more
elastic emigrant labor supplies than the rest of Europe. This revisionist finding is consistent with Alan
Taylor's (1994) research which shows that Argentina's immigration was no more responsive to wage gaps
than was Australia's. This new evidence seems to do heavy damage to the arguments of Leff, Lewis, and
Diaz-Alejandro: Latin American development did not take place under uniquely elastic labor supplies.
Still, a rejection of the elastic labor supply hypothesis does not necessarily imply that rapid rates of
labor force growth didn't matter. After all, a rise in labor-land ratios would keep wages from rising in
economies where agriculture was dominant and industrialization only a promise for the distant future. The
Lewis model is quiet about what happens to land rents under those circumstances, but the classical model
from which it was derived certainly predicted a rise. Since the mass migration boom prior to World War I and
the bust thereafter correlates so well with the bust then boom in the wage-rental ratio (Table 3), perhaps there
is something to be said for changing endowments and labor supply.
It follows that the Heckscher-Ohlin globalization model and the Lewis labor-surplus model both
predict falling wage-rental ratios and rising inequality in Latin America prior to World War I and the opposite
thereafter. The labor surplus model could also be used to predict stable real wages and falling wage-rental
ratios in Southeast Asia, since the migration of surplus labor from India and China might have served to
create an elastic labor supply in, for example, land-abundant Burma, Siam, and the Philippines.9 It follows
that globalization and the Lewis model both predict falling wage-rental ratios and rising inequality in
Southeast Asia. They predict the opposite in labor-abundant East and South Asia. Since they make the same
prediction, discriminating empirically between the competing Lewis and Heckscher-Ohlin views will prove
difficult. Yet, if it can be shown that a good share of the variance in land-labor trends across the Third World
prior to 1940 was driven by labor migration experience, then it can also be said that globalization events --
assume,of course, that there is no comparable elastic supply of land on these frontiers. For this
endogenous-land argument, see Myint (1958) and Findlay (1995: Chp. 5).HIaMyint's theoretical work was
motivated by Burmese experience.
21commodity price convergence and factor mobility --accountfor much of the real wage perfomiance, factor
price convergence, and inequality experience there. The case in favor of commodity price convergence would
be even stronger if it can be shown that factor mobility took place in response to the trade-creating price
shocks.
Changes in relative factor prices can tell us a lot about changes in the distribution of income. This
connection is especially useful since complete income distributions at various benchmarks between the mid-
19th century and World War II are unavailable for any Third World country. But even if such data were
available, it is not obvious that they would be the best way to search for the underlying causes of changing
inequality. Our interest here is factor prices: wages, rents and the structure of pay. How did the typical
unskilled worker near the bottom of the distribution do relative to the typical landowner or capitalist near the
top, or even relative to the typical skilled blue collar worker or educated white collar employee near the
middle? The modem debate over OECD inequality has a fixation on wages, but since land and landed
interests are far more important in pre-industrial agrarian nations, they need to be added to any Third World
distribution inquiry. In any case, we have two kinds of evidence available to get hints about inequality trends
in Asia and Latin America prior to 1940: trends in the wage-rental ratio, which we have already explored; and
trends in the ratio of the unskilled wage to GDP per capita, which we have yet to explore. There is no reason
to expect a perfect correlation between the two measures: after all, GDP includes returns to all factors, not
just land. But since land was such an important asset in the pre-1940 Third World --incontrast with human
capital, I expect the correlation to be close.
Table 4 reports for Asia trends in the ratio of the unskilled worker's wage (w) to the returns on all
factors per person as measured by Maddisons (1995) estimates of GDP per capita (y). True, the ratio could
be influenced by changes in the labor participation rate alone. If there was a sharp increase in population from
a rise in fertility or a fall in child mortality, and thus no increase in workers of adult age, w/y would
(spuriously) rise as y fell. In contrast, if there was a sharp increase in population from the immigration of
22adult labor, wlywouldappear more stable. While this was not a period of dramatic demographic transition in
Asia (Bloom and Williamson 1998), the immigration into Southeast Asia probably tends to make downward
trends in w/y overstate rising inequality there. Suppose, in addition, that days or weeks worked per year
increased due to seasonal smoothing and other forces that eroded underemployment? Then GDP per capita
would rise, the daily or weekly wage would not, and thus wlywouldfall. Some of the observed changes in
w/y could also be driven by the performance of the price of wage goods (in the cost-of-living index
underlying the real wage, dominated by the price of rice and other grains) relative to the GDP deflator
(underlying the real GDP per capita estimates). But such relative price movements have clear distributional
implications on the expenditure side, since the poor are more dependent on rice and other foodstuffs than are
the rich (as a share of their budgets). These qualifications are likely to matter, but one can only hope that
trends in w/y approximate changes in the economic distance between the working poor near the bottom of the
distribution and the average citizen in the middle of the distribution, especially if our primary goal is to
explain differences in those trends across countries and between epochs. I am optimistic since the statistic is
highly correlated with more comprehensive inequality measures in the few cases where both are available for
the Atlantic economy prior to 1940 (\Williamson 1998d: Table 5).
Table 4 shows that any successful explanation of changes in wlyinAsia between 1870 and 1940
will have to be complex: the Heckscher-Ohlin and Lewis models will not, by themselves, account for all the
variety. Still, they seem able to account for much of it. Japan, India, Indonesia and Thailand document the
longest time series, and each underwent a long sharp decline in wlybeforeflattening out or even rising after
World War I. The turning point for Indonesia seems to be the late 1920s, but for the other three it is 1915-
1919. The real wage lag behind GDP per capita in these four Asian countries during the first great
globalization boom seems to offer evidence of some weaker version of the Lewis model, not constant wages
but rather sluggish growth and modest trickling down. But why the common turning point for four economies
with such different attributes? Since it seems unlikely that such dissimilar economies could share the same
23Lewis turning point, perhaps a more likely explanation lies with world markets. These four countries were
more likely to have shared similar globalization-induced price shocks which produced the same trends in w/y.
The Philippine and Burmese time series are much shorter, but what we have obeys the same Asian
laws of motion that we have seen already for the other four countries. The Philippine turning point is 19 10-
1914, and it shares the steep decline up to that point and the sharp reversal thereafter. The experience of
Taiwan and Korea is similar, with their turning points in 1915-1919, although the Korean time series is much
too short to be very confident about long run turning points. As an aside, this evidence also does not offer
much support for the nationalist critique of Japanese imperialist policies. If imperialism tended to exploit the
ordinary native worker in occupied Korea and Taiwan, while favoring landlords in those two regions and
Japanese consumers at home, why do we not see that redistribution in the form of falling wfyafterthe 1910-
1919 decade? Why does the ratio rise instead? The answer may lie with world markets rather than imperial
policy.
We have found an important Asian stylized fact. Real wages lagged behind GDP per capita growth
everywhere in Asia up to the World War I decade. Real wages outstripped GDP per capita growth thereafter.
Latin America shares the same stylized fact with Asia. Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay document the longest
w/y time series, and they all underwent a long, steep decline in w/y before it flattened out or even rose after
World War I (Table 5). The turning point for all three is 1915-1919, a result consistent with Argentina's
wage-rental ratio trends. Although Cuba's time series is shorter, it seemed to obey the same laws of motion
and the same turning point. Colombia's time series is even shorter than Cuba's, so we do not know whether
1910-1914 was a turning point for Colombia or not. The only evidence in Table 5 inconsistent with either the
Heckscher-Ohlin or the Lewis model is Brazil, which underwent a steady decline in wlyfromthe turn of the
century onwards in both the Northeast and the Southeast. The behavior of this inequality proxy can be best
summarized for all of Latin America by pooling the annual data underlying the five-year averages in Table 5.
24An estimated non-linear regression predicts that w/y reached a minimum in 1918-1919. '°
Whydid the real wage lag behind GDP per capita in so much of the Third World during the first
great globalization boom? Is this evidence of some weaker version of the Lewis model, not constant wages
but rather wage lag? Is it evidence supporting the factor-price convergence theorem where factors are quality-
adjusted? Is it both? The striking fact is that there is a common turning point shared by economies with such
different attributes. Since it seems unlikely that such dissimilar economies in such different parts of the world
could share the same Lewis labor supply turning point, perhaps a more likely explanation lies with world
commodity markets. These countries were more likely to have shared similar globalization-induced price
shocks which produced the same trends in wly.Ofcourse, these two forces might be considered
complementary rather than competing hypotheses, especially if the labor supply changes were driven by
across-border migration, making both globalization-induced. The next section considers other possible
explanations.
Explicit Theory and an Econometric Agenda
Not too long ago, Kevin O'Rourke, Alan Taylor and myself discovered evidence of relative factor
price convergence in the late 19th century Atlantic economy (O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson 1996). This
is a different fact than the absolute real wage convergence documented in Figure 1. Instead, it was relative
factor price convergence as measured by the wage-rental ratio, where the rents refer to farm rents or farm land
values, as was true of the estimates reported here for Argentina, Korea, Taiwan, Japan and the Punjab. The
convergence was manifested mainly by the collapse of the wage-rental ratio in the land-abundant and labor-
scarce New World, and by the surge of the ratio in the land-scarce and labor-abundant Old World. Relative
'°Theratio wlyisregressed on time (estimated coefficient =-1.355, t-statistic=3.955) andtime-
squared (estimated coefficient =+0.0004,t-statistic =3.934),and the predicted minimum is 1918.8.
25factor prices were, of course, never equalized, but a good share of the relative endowment scarcities on either
side of the Atlantic Ocean were eroded by World War I. Furthermore, the rise in the wage-rental ratio was
much greater in those parts of Europe that stuck with free trade --Britain,Ireland and Scandinavia --thanin
those parts of Europe that retreated behind tariff walls --France,Germany and Spain. This fact seemed to
offer a clear confirmation of the Heckscher-Ohlin factor price convergence theorem: that the export boom on
both sides of the Atlantic could account for the convergence by causing the derived demand for the abundant
and cheap factor to boom, that is, land and rents in the New World versus labor and wages in the Old World.
'When we turned to the econometrics, this plausible interpretation met with some empirical resistance and it
had to be modified. Would the same be true of the wage-rental and wage-GDP per capita trends I have
documented in this paper for the Third World?
As my frequent reference to the Lewis labor surplus model was meant to suggest, there are certainly
other explanations of relative factor price trends that might compete with the Heckscher-Ohlin model."
First, one might appeal to the discovery and exploitation of land and natural resources at the open
frontiers in the post-1850 Third World. Classical theories of pre-mdustnal performance argued that
population growth would cause the relative price of land to rise as long as land scarcity did not choke off that
growth. Certainly Maithus saw it that way: demographic events pushed up man-land ratios, lowered real
wages, raised land rents, and caused the wage-rental ratio to fall to a new long run equilibrium where zero
population growth was reattained. David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill told similar, but more explicit, stories.
This theoretical tradition of European pre-industrial pessimism was carried into the late 19th century by the
writings of Alfred Marshall, and Henry George. It has also influenced late 20th century mathematical models
of growth, debates over sustainable growth provoked in the 1 970s by the Club of Rome, and concern about
the deteriorating natural resource environment in the Third World. Indeed, it is implied by Lewis' (1954)
famous paper on economic development with unlimited labor supplies.
"The remainder of this section draws heavily on O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson (1996: 505-9).
26But since European emigrants moved to Cuba and the Southern Cone in massive numbers in the late
19th century, wage-rental ratios should have fallen there by much more than in Europe, a Mill-Ricardo
argument that should help account for the opposing factor-price trends in these two parts of the world.
Similarly, there was a huge migration from labor surplus parts of South and East Asia to labor scarce parts of
Southeast Asia: Indian emigrants went in large numbers to Burma, Ceylon, and Malaya, while Chinese
emigrants went in large numbers to Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Siam, French Indo-China and the
Philippines (Latham 1986: 11). But if factor migration was the only economic event taking place in Asia,
why the similar trends in relative factor prices at various locations? Were land and natural resources in
Southeast Asia exploited just as fast, or even faster, than the rate of immigration (Myint 1958; Findlay
1995)? Was land (relative to labor) in East Asia extended on the intensive margin (by double-cropping) just
as fast as on the extensive margin (by settlement) in Southeast Asia?
In general, then, this paradigm places heavy emphasis on international factor reallocation and
endogenous resource exploitation as the mechanisms by which a fundamental disequilibrium in history was
partially resolved: capital and labor chased higher returns (and each other) by migrating from land-scarce to
land-abundant regions. Of course, a world policy commitment to integrated factor markets is needed to give
the paradigm a chance to explain reality --unrestrictedmass migration and capital flows. The language of
this paradigm sounds very much like John Stuart Mill, who, in 1848, anticipated the factor-price convergence
debate by stressing the contribution of factor migration while ignoring what I have stressed thus far, the
impact of commodity price convergence.
Second, one could explore accumulation forces. Capital deepening should, after all, raise the wage-
rental ratio. Industrialization and capital deepening usually go together, and to that extent capital-deepening
cannot have played an important part in the Third World. After all, industrialization was not an important
part of Latin American and Asian experience, at least up to 1914. Paraphrasing Lewis (1978a), the Third
World had a choice between importing European industrialization or exporting primary products, and they
27choose the latter prior to the Great War. Thus, accumulation and capital-deepening are unlikely toplay a
major role in accounting for the relative factor price trends observed for the Third World.
Third, one might appeal to economic forces associated with changes in technology. As we haveseen,
there was real wage and living standard improvement in Asia and Latin Americaup to 1914. True, there was
very little evidence of catching up with the European industrial leaders, but there is abundant evidence that
much of the Third World was at least holding its own. Industrial revolutions typically embodyproductivity
growth which favors industiy. Since industrial output makes little use of farmland, industrialization tends to
be relatively land-saving, raising instead the relative demands for labor and capital. Such industrial
revolutionaiy events should, therefore, tend to raise the wage-rental ratio. According to this prediction, more
rapid industrialization in Japan compared with Siam (Feeny 1996; Yasuba and Dhiravegin 1985) should also
have served to raise the wage-rental ratio by more in Japan than in Siam. Such events should have contributed
to factor-price convergence within Asia. This prediction would be reinforced if productivity advance inpre-
1940 East Asia was land-saving and labor-using, while the opposite was true in Southeast Asia, justas the
induced-innovation hypothesis would suggest (Hayami and Ruttan 1971).
Fourth, what about relative output prices and the terms of trade? The Third World terms of trade
must have been driven by two forces: first, there were the globalization forces which caused commodity
prices to converge world wide and caused export prices to boom everywhere; and second, there were
independent supply side forces driving the relative price of primary products world wide. The globalization
forces were driven by the decline in transport costs world wide, declines that were probablygreater in the
periphery, where they were rarely muted by tariff increase, than the core, where they were often muted by
tariff increases. On these grounds alone, the relative price of exportables probably increased bymore in the
periphery in response to globalization forces than in the core. Supply-side forces were dominated by
unbalanced productivity advance favoring industry. This tended to lower the relative cost of quality-adjusted
industrial goods world wide, and, thus, to raise the relative price of Third World primary' products still
28further. These two forces reinforced each other in the primaiy-product-producing periphery while they offset
each other in the industrial core. Thus, the pre-1914 price shocks favoring exportables were bigger in the
periphery than in the core. Both forces reversed around World War I: there was de-globalization with the
move towards autarky; and there was an industrial productivity slowdown at the center.'2
The theoiy just reviewed makes the empirical agenda clear. I am in theprocess of developing a pre-
1940 Third World data base that includes the following: the relative price of exportables in the home market;
land-labor ratios (where the numerator is adjusted for multiple cropping and irrigation); a Solow residual
constructed as the log of output per worker minus a factor share times the log of the land-labor ratio (aproxy
for productivity growth and a correlate with unbalanced productivity advance and aggregate factor saving);
urbanization indices (a proxy for the independent influence of industrialization); and a time dummy to see
whether the World War I turning point evaporates when I control for these other forces. The results should be
informative, especially when they are compared with what W. Arthur Lewis suggested many decades ago.
12 In the shortrun, there was also the influence of an excess supply of primary products at the
periphery generated by the long boom from the 1890s to the end of the War.
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Real Wage in Asia Relative to Britain 1830-1 939
(in percent)
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35 26 18 11
23 28 16 16
25 46 19 20
31 55 22 16















































Source: For Asia, Williamson (1998a: Table 3). For the
Appendix Table A2.3; 1995: Appendix Table All).
28 20 22 40 22 22
25 19 25 39 19 20
Middle East, Williamson (1998b: Table 1, Appendix Table A1.3Table 2
Real Wage in Latin America Relative to Great Britain, 1830-1939
(in percent)








1865-1869 81.8 17.2 7.6 28.6
1870-1874 86.5 17.3 6.2 22.6
1875-1879 65.8 18.2 5.2 16.3
1880-1884 81.2 19.9 4.7 19.0 66.5 95.4
1885-1889 85.3 20.0 3.8 23.8 58.1 109.2
1890-1894 87.8 16.1 3.3 25.0 56.4 119.2
1895-1899 85.9 14.8 3.3 26.3 56.0 91.8
1900-1904 101.0 19.7 5.4 58.4 86.8
1905-1909 92.0 22.3 7.2 76.2 61.7 88.2
1910-1914 100.8 23.4 7.4 24.8 74.8 60.6 95.2
1915-1919 91.1 21.5 5.8 36.9 84.3 30.0 81.0
1920-1924 103.9 14.8 3.8 35.0 84.0 29.1 95.3
1925-1929 125.5 17.2 3.8 44.9 95.3 37.0 108.7
1930-1934 116.6 18.8 2.6 60.5 89.9 40.7 111.4
1935-1939 115.2 48.4 85.1 32.4 104.4
Source: Williamson (1998c: Table 3).Table 3
WagelRental Ratio Trends in the Third World 1873-1 939
PeriodArgentina The PunjabJapan Korea Taiwan Egypt
1873-1879 2.5807 2.5075
1880-1884 1.9249 3.8373
1885-1889 4.8418 1.9874 0.9120 7.5873
1890-1894 4.3427 1.3411 0.7864 5.1706
1894-1899 3.7043 1.2157 1.0401 2.2925
1900-1904 3.4503 1.2549 1.0950 0.6805 2.1240
1905-1909 1.6100 1.1860 1.2586 0.8331 0.8507 0.9212
1910-1914 1.0001 1.0109 1.2253 0.9876 0.9645 1.2679
1915-1919 0.6379 1.1496 1.1953 0.8867 1.1106 1.1012
1950-1924 0.6324 0.9821 1.8926 1.7624 1.3985 1.7671
1925-1929 0.6072 0.7858 2.3062 1.6965 1.3467 1.5760
1930-1934 0.6951 0.4092 2.6160 1.5728 1.3057 1.5401
1935-1939 0.7089 0.3402 1.7082 1.7463 1.2342 1.2922
Sources and Notes: The base year is 1913 =1.00.The Argentine figure for 1885-89 is actually
1883-89, and the Egyptian figure for 1873-79 is actually 1877-79. Williamson (1998a: Table 6;
1998b: Appendix Table A1.4; and 1998c: Table 7)Table 4
Wage/GDP Per Capita Ratio Trends in Asia 1870-1 939
Period Japan Burma IndiaIndonesiaKoreaPhillipinesTaiwanThailand
1870-18741.4016 2.1486 1.5218 1.9264
1875-18791.2644 1.7803 1.5550 1.7828
1880-18841.2106 2.0345 1.5882 1.9002
1885-18891.1526 2.0515 1.6214 1.7687
1890-18940.8749 1.7892 1.6031 1.3852
1895-18991.0058 1.5953 1.5074 0.8261
1900-19040.9981 1.7407 1.4692 1.3885 1.2781 1.2883 0.8968
1905-19090.9794 1.6477 1.2094 1.1887 1.0525 1.1818 0.6968
1910-19141.0123 1.0404 1.0369 1.0221 1.0231 0.9811 0.9377 0.9116
1915-19190.8824 0.6210 0.9666 0.8276 0.8667 1.2483 0.7985 0.8963
1920-19240.9955 1.3259 0.7020 1.3046 1.8559 1.1512 1.0046
1925-19290.8927 1.4189 0.6964 1.0986 1.2785 1.0175 0.8913
1930-19340.9896 2.4310 1.0620 1.0060 1.4769 1.0943 1.5066
1935-19390.4103 2.2626 0.9750 0.9168 1.4729 0.8174 1.3449
Sources and Notes: The real GDP per capita data are taken from Maddison (1995). The wage/GDP per capita ratio
is itself reported in Williamson (1998a: Table 7). The base year is 1913 =1.00.Table 5






Colombia Cuba Mexico Uruguay
1870-1874 1.6947
1875-1879 1.3286
1880-1884 1.4769 1.1881 1.9047
1885-1889 1.5663 1.0899 2.2004
1890-1894 1.5191 1.0387 2.2555
1895-1899 1.4428 0.0503 1.6946
1900-1904 1.4570 1.2209 1.5325 0.9702 1.3658
1905-1909 1.0500 1.1529 1.4431 1.2108 0.8633 1.0966
1910-1914 1.0433 1.0318 1.1451 1.3317 0.9924 0.7738 1.0759
1915-1919 0.9230 0.7899 0.6751 1.5811 0.9329 0.2982 0.8981
1920-1924 1.1298 0.6280 0.5383 1.9191 1.2210 0.3615 1.1346
1925-1929 1.2440 0.5912 0.5361 2.2206 1.4785 0.4613 1.1785
1930-1934 1.4144 0.5760 0.3652 3.0818 1.5704 0.6903 1.4745
1935-1939 1.3032









information for Cuba is from Astorga and Fitzgerald (1998). Income per capita estimates for the regions of Brazil are
from Gomes (1986). These GDP per capita figures were interpolated where necessary and rebased so that 1913 =1.00.
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